

315

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY	USSR/Austria	REPORT NO.		50X1
SUBJECT	Soviet Army Training and Maneuvers	DATE DISTR.	5 December 1955	
	50X1	NO. OF PAGES	16	
DATE OF INFO.		REQUIREMENT NO.	RD	
PLACE ACQUIRED		REFERENCES		
DATE ACQUIRED				50X1

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

50X1

Comment: On page 5, paragraph 6, read Shlem-1 gas mask for Shelm 1 gas mask.

50X1

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

50X1

CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT I

50X1

COUNTRY USSR

DATE DISTR. 28 Oct 1955

SUBJECT Soviet Army Training and Maneuvers

NO. OF PAGES 15

50X1

DATE OF INFORMATION

REFERENCES:

PLACE ACQUIRED

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

50X1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

50X1

- 2 -

SOVIET ARMY TRAINING AND MANEUVERS

Table of Contents

<u>Item</u>	<u>Page</u>
A. BASIC TRAINING	3
B. REGIMENTAL GARRISON TRAINING	3
1. General Background	3
2. Training for New Arrivals	3
3. Training Periods	3
4. Schedules	4
5. Political Training	5
6. Atomic Warfare Training	5
7. Chemical Warfare Training	6
8. Air-Ground Support Training and Identification	6
9. Combined Arms Tng Involving Arty Support and Tank- Infantry Operations	6
10. Anti-Tank Training	6
11. Engineer Bridging Training	6
12. Passive Air Defense Training	7
13. Night Training	7
14. Other Types of Training; Firing	7
15. Inspections of the Regiment	7
C. REGIMENTAL AND OTHER SCHOOLS	8
D. REGIMENTAL SIG CO TRAINING	9
1. Instructors	9
2. Training Schedule	9
3. Signal Training	10
a. Wire Laying	10
b. Switchboard and Radio Operations	10
4. Political Training	10
5. Chemical Warfare Training	10
6. Weapons Firing	11
7. Atomic Defense Training	11
8. Inspections	12
E. ALERTS AND TRAINING EXERCISES	12
1. Alerts	12
2. Movement to the Field and Field Conditions	12
3. Field Exercises	13
a. Command Post Exercise in Feb 1954	13
b. Field Exercise in August 1954	13
c. Field Exercise in January 1955	14
d. CPX in May 1955	14
e. Other Exercise	15
4. Large Scale Motor Moves	15

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

50X1

SOVIET ARMY TRAINING AND MANEUVERS**A. BASIC TRAINING**

Source took basic training from [redacted] 1953 at an unidentified guards rifle regiment in Stanislaw (N 48-56, E 24-42), the USSR.¹ Source has forgotten most of the details and could only comment generally on his basic training. His training company of about 200 recruits consisted of four platoons. The training was given almost totally by platoon groups. About four hours a day were spent on close-order drill and about eight hours a week were spent on extended-order drill and individual fortification construction. Political instruction averaged four to six hours a week. About two hours a day were spent in the study of basic Soviet field manuals, such as the Disciplinary Manual and Interior Guard Manual. There was no signal or chemical training. Only two to three hours a week were spent on physical training outside of the morning calisthenics. Very little instruction was given on individual arms. Source fired three rounds from the M1944 carbine and nine rounds from the PPSH SMG. The training schedule was eight hours, six days per week; but the recruit was actually busy from 0600 to 2400 hours every day.

50X1

B. REGIMENTAL GARRISON TRAINING**1. General Background**

Although Source had been a member of the 290th Gds Rifle Regt from [redacted] he was poorly qualified to give any specific and concrete information on training matters as practised in his regiment. Since he was completely uninterested in and unobservant of training matters, such information as he was able to give was centered around training as it affected him personally; and in such cases his information was quite general. He was able to give some training information on his own particular company but less on the regiment as a whole. He could give practically no information on specific training in regimental subunits other than his own company.

50X1

Since the summer of 1954 each of the two rifle battalions had had one company on demarcation line duty. One of the battalions also had a company on guard duty at division headquarters. These three companies never joined the regiment for training, and presumably followed their own training program in place.

2. Training for New Arrivals

All new arrivals in the regiment had taken a two month basic training course in the USSR prior to assignment to the regiment. Immediately upon arrival at the regiment these men underwent a 15 day period of quarantine, during which they received additional training in basic military subjects. After the quarantine period these men were assigned to units in the regiment; a large portion of them were detailed to the regimental school. EM in their first year of service in the regular regimental subunits took the same training as the other members of their units, except that the political training was separate, the physical training exercises more simple and minimum qualification scores for individual arms firing lower.

3. Training Periods

The training year began on 1 December of each year and continued until about the beginning of October the following fall. The training year was split into a winter and a summer training period. Almost all of the regiment's training was conducted in its caserne area. It did not move to the field in the spring and remain there for a long period; instead, it participated in two or three short field exercises, each of which lasted from 10 to 12 days. These field exercises plus CPX's were conducted at the Allentsteig (N 48-41, E 15-19) training area. In addition, regimental artillery and other units with crew-served weapons such as mortars, anti-tank pieces, SU's, etc., periodically went to Allentsteig for short periods of live firing.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 4 -

50X1

At the conclusion of the training year in October, there was a period of about two months during which preparations were made for the new training year. This was also the period when soldiers completing three years of service were demobilized and when new recruits arrived from basic training camps in the USSR. The soldiers starting their second and third years of service were kept busy with housekeeping details and preparation of equipment for the new training year. Almost all training was suspended during this period except for the new recruits who underwent a 15 day period of quarantine separately from the other personnel. Unit CO's were authorized to hold limited training in their own units on any subject which they believed was necessary. The only required training for second and third year men during this period was political training.

4. Schedules

Troop training was conducted six hours a day six days a week. The normal daily training schedule and list of calls was as follows: (The times given are Moscow time)

0700	Reveille
0700 - 0735	Calisthenics
0735 - 0750	Personal toilet
0750 - 0820	Free time
0820 - 0900	Breakfast
0900	Regimental training formation
0900 - 1500	Training individually by subunits, each according to its own training schedule. In some units, such as the Sig Co, each platoon had its own training schedule.
1500 - 1530	Dinner
1530 - 1700	Compulsory rest period
1700 - 1715	Preliminary marksmanship instruction - (Strelkovyy trenazh).
1715 - 1900	Care and cleaning of equipment period.
1900 - 1930	Free time
1930 - 2000	Political period
2000 - 2100	Supper After supper until evening roll-call formation, the EM had free time.
2320	Evening roll-call formation
2330 - 2345	Evening walk and singing in formation
2400	Taps

Saturday afternoons were usually set aside for housekeeping duties instead of training. On Sundays the troops were generally free, unless there was a scheduled regimental cross country run (usually three kilometers). In such

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

50X1

- 5 -

instances the entire enlisted cadre of the regiment and at least one officer from each unit was required to participate. No political training was conducted on Sunday. Many of the men were placed on work details. Some attended the regimental movie, others engaged in sports. No conscript could legally leave the caserne area. A surprise formation could be held at any time and it was absolutely necessary that all the conscripts be present.

5. Political Training

Political training was conducted two to three times a week, each time for a two hour period, beginning at 0900 hours. This training was conducted by groups. The entire regiment conducted political training during this period. Each unit was responsible for its own political training. (See section C for other political training, in Source's Sig Co.)

Political training was broken down into two parts: the half-hour political information period in the evening and that conducted two or three times a week under the regular training schedule. During that conducted under the training schedule, purely political subjects were given such as the study of past Communist exploits, Communist theory and teachings and the history of the Party. The half-hour political information period given during the evening was used to instill in the men patriotism, courage, discipline and a will to fight. They included the usual harangues on "imperialist nations", and were of an anti-western-bloc nature. This period was also used to present current events.

6. Atomic Warfare Training 2.

In early 1955, regimental personnel were allegedly shown a top secret film, title unknown, in connection with atomic defense training. An unidentified major from division headquarters gave a short talk preceding the film and cautioned the men not to disclose its contents.

In general, the film showed the following: Soviet professors at work in their laboratory on supposed atomic equipment and research, an elementary explanation of atomic structure, and several types of alleged radiation measuring devices. These latter were small, approximately eight inch on a side box-like mechanisms; some had a voltmeter-type dial while others had a blinking red lamp. Source could add no further detail on this equipment. The film then showed an alleged atomic explosion against Soviet troops occupying defensive positions. The troops were lined face down in their trenches. No indication was given as to who was the originator of the blast or under what circumstances. Following the blast and the shock wave, chemical reconnaissance men (called in film "Khim Razvedchiki") dressed in what appeared to be the conventional impregnated anti-gas suit and gas mask, moved forward out of the trenches carrying rectangular radiation dosage detection devices (called in film "Dosimer") in their hands. After they returned the troops moved forward in the attack, with tank-riding infantry followed by more infantry moving out after an artillery preparation. The tanks were completely buttoned up while the infantry were wearing the Shelm 1 gas mask and protective socks, gloves and capes. The attack was successful, and the attackers were then shown returning to a decontamination point. Here the chemical reconnaissance men, clad as before, checked the radiation dosage of each man (again with the rectangular-like "dosimer"). The more seriously affected were shown being sent to a medical point. The others stacked their weapons and equipment, removed their clothing, tagged it and placed it in a separate pile. The men then took a shower while their clothing was being brushed and washed by the chemical reconnaissance personnel. Following this the men were shown receiving their decontaminated clothing and equipment. An alleged portable laboratory mounted on a conventional chassis was then shown. Inside the van there were about five men seated behind a conveyor belt analyzing rations, water and soil for radioactivity. Source had no further information on this van. The film ended at this point.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 6 -

50X1

7. Chemical Warfare Training

Source did not know specifically what type of chemical training was given in the rifle battalions of his regiment. He only knew that their chemical training was more intensive than that given to the regimental separate companies.

More intensified chemical training was given separately in the regimental chemical platoon. Each regimental subunit detailed three or four men to attend training of an unknown nature with this platoon. These men met two or three times a month for two or three hour periods. These small groups did not, however in turn, give any chemical training within their own units.

8. Air-Ground Support Training and Identification

There was no air-ground support training except that in the January 1955 field exercises (see section D) four unidentified jet fighters made simulated strafing passes while the regiment was occupying a defensive position. (See section E for further details). These fighters dropped dynamite charges before the front lines of the defending elements.

Source knew of no means or system of identification in the regiment used to identify Soviet ground units to Soviet air units. He knew of no liaison system in the regiment for coordination of air-ground tactics. He knew of no air identification panels in the Sig Co supply setup.

9. Combined Arms Training Involving Artillery Support and Tank-Infantry Operations

The only time there was any combined arms training involving artillery support and tank-infantry training was during the Aug 54 and Jan 55 field exercises (See section D). Unknown division tank elements with T-34's together with the 287th Gd Rifle Regt, simulated an attack on Source's regiment while it was in defense. T-34 tanks also supported source's regiment in the defense.

Division artillery elements also took part in these exercises, but source could offer no further information either on tank infantry training or artillery support. He had seen the regimental SP Btry practising tactical formations in the regimental area with the rifle battalions. Source could give no specific information, however.

10. Anti-Tank Training

In the regiment was a battery of new 107 mm rocket launchers. Source had no information on the employment of these weapons.

11. Engineer Bridging Training

Source knew of no engineer bridging operations or training in his regiment, and he did not even believe that the regiment's parent division had the means to set up a bridge across anything larger than a brook. At his regiment there were no means to set up a bridge across any stream larger than a creek, according to his belief. The regimental engineer company did have a few unidentified small rubber boats but no bridging equipment of any type.

However, source had heard of a large bridging operation in 1953 (the year prior to his arrival) in which his division had participated. This had taken place somewhere in Austria, across the Danube River. It was rumored to have been a miserable failure because of the swiftness of the river.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 7 -

50X1

12. Passive Air Defense Training

No passive air defense training was given to the individual soldier in Source's regiment. The regimental air advance-warning post was responsible for air-raid warnings. This post was composed of seven personnel from the regimental signal company and was located on the top floor of the signal company billets while the regiment was in winter quarters. The post's equipment consisted of an RBM-1 radio; binoculars; aircraft identification cards; a telephone; and a circular, mechanical direction indicator. The post was tied into the division system of advance air warning posts by the RBM-1 radio. When the regiment was in the field, this post set up an air advance-warning post at an advantageous point in the front line units and was tied into the regimental radio net. Source was of the opinion that air warnings would come down by radio from division through the regimental member air-warning post.

13. Night Training

There was practically no night training while source's regiment was in its caserne area. The rifle battalions did some night firing on the regimental firing range from their individual small arms but he knew no details of this. Other regimental units did not participate in this firing.

Most of the night training was conducted during the field exercises. During these exercises most of the movement was done at night. Driving was done with black-out lights and simulated combat conditions were observed. Road marches were made during the hours of darkness, and units did their displacing also at night. Source had to lay wire a good portion of the time during the hours of darkness.

14. Other Types of Training: Firing

Source stated that no instruction was given in "living off the country".

Source did not know how much training was required before a unit or individual was considered combat-ready. He believed that this was determined by the semi-annual inspections.

There was no familiarization training with individual or crew-served weapons other than that with which the regimental personnel were regularly armed. Training was conducted only with T/E individual arms. Firing was conducted at the regimental firing range located a short distance outside the regimental caserne area. The infantrymen in the rifle battalions fired a more elaborate, combat course than that given in Source's company (see section D). The course for those armed with the SMG was as follows: The firer, in a trench and wearing a gas mask and armed with 30 rounds, fired from the prone position in short 8-round bursts at appearing chest-silhouette targets 200 m away. Then he removed his gas mask and moved forward for about 100 m. As he ran, he fired at a wooden shield in his path, threw a grenade at it, and kept on moving. Now chest-silhouette targets suddenly appeared to his front at 150 to 200 m distance. He brought them under his fire from the prone position and then moved past them. At this time several additional, moving, full-silhouette targets appeared at a distance of 200 m. He fired from the prone position at them, and this finished the exercise.

For infantrymen armed with the carbine, the firing course was basically the same. Source did not know the scoring procedures for either of these two courses.

15. Inspections of the Regiment

Twice, in 1954 and in the spring of 1955, the regiment's training and proficiency were inspected by a commission composed of staff officers from the division headquarters, GQG headquarters and Defense Ministry headquarters. The

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 8 -

50X1

commanding general CGF inspected the regiment in August 1954. The inspection commission consisted of about 50 unidentified officers ranging in rank from senior lieutenant to general. These inspections were of the semi-annual type which were regularly held in the spring and in the fall. Every aspect of military training was touched on. There was no detailed inspection of technical equipment and proficiency, nor was the regiment's tactical proficiency tested fully at this time.

The procedure of this inspection took the following general form. The regiment was formed, the officers forming several paces forward, the NCO's a few paces behind the officers, and the other ranks behind the NCO's. The inspecting group then inspected the EM and officers in the ranks, particularly asking for any complaints. No one ever voiced any complaints during these inspections.

The regiment was then broken down by units and the close-order drill proficiency of each unit was inspected. The regiment was again reformed and passed in review, concluding this phase of the inspection.

On the second day the inspecting body was broken down into smaller groups to continue the inspections. Each inspecting group then checked a certain phase of the training in each subunit. In Source's company the second day was devoted to inspection of each man's physical conditioning. On the third day the company was taken to the regimental small arms range and individual small arms firing proficiency was inspected. On the fourth and fifth days the commission continued the inspection on the remaining military subjects not yet covered.

The inspecting commission also called a practise alert to test the unit in this phase. The regiment was well warned in advance about this portion of the inspection and performed well.

Detailed inspection of signal personnel proficiency were made later by a group from division headquarters comprised mostly of division signal officers, as was the signal equipment of the company and regiment.

The regiment was not inspected on any tactical training or required to show its proficiency in the field.

It had been rumored in the regiment [redacted] that beginning with the fall of 1955 these semi-annual inspections were to be held at unannounced times to more effectively test the units. Before the units had known the dates of the inspections well in advance and prepared for them accordingly.

50X1

During the spring inspection in 1955 the regimental signal setup was rated "3". The general overall rating for Source's Sig Co was "4". Other ratings were unknown to Source.

G. REGIMENTAL AND OTHER SCHOOLS

The regimental school in Source's regiment was responsible for training NCO's. This school was staffed by five officers: the CO, the Deputy CO for Political Matters, and three platoon leaders. It had a Mortar Platoon, a Machine Gun Platoon, and a Rifle Platoon. There were about six NCO's permanently attached as cadre. About 120 students, only those in their first year of service, were trained each year. Some were volunteers while the remainder of the quota was detailed to attend.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 9 -

50X1

The course lasted for nine months, beginning about the end of October or the first part of November just after new arrivals had come to the unit and finished their quarantine period. Source did not know the exact training given except that generally the same subjects were presented as were given to the regular units; they were, however, of a more intensified and comprehensive nature. The discipline was considerably more strict than in the rest of the regiment. All instruction was given by the school officers and cadre. Upon completion of the course about 90 percent of the graduates received the rank of junior sergeant, while the remainder were given the rank of PFC or no rank. The students were normally returned to their original units.

The Sig Co sent three to four men each year to the division Sig Bn for enrollment in a nine-month service school. All Sig Co conscripts were eligible provided they had at least five years of schooling and were in their first year of service. It was also necessary for candidates to have a good ear for Morse code training. The scope of the course was unknown to source. Graduates received the rank of junior sergeant, and most Sig Co personnel attending became senior radio operators upon their return to the company. Source did not know what degree of proficiency was required for this position.

The Sig Co also sent one man to a radio repairman's course at an unknown unit in Baden each year. This course lasted for one year. Men volunteered for it. The prerequisites were that men be in their first year of service and have at least seven years of schooling. No promotions were given upon graduation from this course.

About 60 men a year were sent from the regiment to the division driver's school in Allentsteig, to pursue a six week drivers' course and were subsequently returned to the regiment.

Regimental artillery personnel did not attend any special courses. All of their training was given on the job.

D. REGIMENTAL SIG CO TRAINING

1. Instructors

Company officers in source's unit, the regimental Sig Co, instructed primarily on signal matters and on political training. The majority of other training subjects were presented by company NCO's, the officers merely supervising. Occasionally the regimental chief of communications would present some training in signal matters.

2. Training Schedule

In source's particular platoon the six hours of training were generally spent as follows (they were given between 0900 and 1500 hours):

- 1st hour - Operation and practical work on the K-10 switchboard (when political lectures were not scheduled).
- 2d and 3d hours - Practical work in telephone line laying.
- 4th hour - Close order drill.
- 5th hour - Study of unclassified conventional Soviet army manuals.
- 6th hour - Physical training.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 10 -

50X1

Source stated each of the two signal platoons had a separate training schedule. He could give no specific details on the radio platoon. During the normal training week about six hours were spent on close order drill, about 15 hours on signal matters, four to six hours on political training, about two hours on individual weapons training, about three hours on the study of Soviet Army manuals and about three to four hours on physical training (besides morning calisthenics). The remaining hours were filled in with subjects that were conducted less frequently, such as chemical training and personal hygiene.

3. Signal Training

a. Wire Laying

Most of the training in Source's platoon consisted of intensive practical work in line laying. Members of the platoon spent much time in the near-by vicinity of the caserne reeling out telephone cable and taking it up. They were taught to lay wire 200 m away from roads, when laying line parallel to them. Areas with high tension lines were crossed at right angles. When railroads were crossed, the wire was laid under the rails or high overhead. Wire was strung at least three meters above hard-top roads, but wire was dug in when crossing dirt roads. When crossing small streams, the wire was strung over the stream. When crossing large streams underwater cable was to be used and laid in the water (there was no such cable in the regiment however). Wire was to be strengthened or snagged every 100 m if possible, and wherever possible lines were to be camouflaged.

Source's platoon had been instructed by its platoon leader, that the linemen were to lay wire in trenches at least 20 cm deep, in view of recent instruction in protecting wire against atomic attack. Even though efforts were made to have the linemen do this during training, source stated that they had little success. He said that he would be forever digging a five kilometer stretch of telephone wire if he had complied.

b. Switchboard and Radio Operations

All members of the telephone platoon also had practical instruction in the operation of the K-10 regimental switchboards. This amounted only to a few hours.

Source's platoon also got a smattering of instruction on the general characteristics of the regimental radios.⁴

4. Political Training

In source's company the political training groups and instructors were as follows:

<u>Group</u>	<u>Instructor</u>
1st year troops	Deputy CO for political training of the company
2d year troops	Company platoon leaders.
3rd year troops	Company CO
All company NCO's	The Regimental chief of communications, or the group studied by itself without an instructor.

5. Chemical Warfare Training

Chemical training in the Sig Co averaged two or three periods a month, lasting 20 to 30 minutes each time. The majority of time was spent in practical training in the use of chemical protective equipment. The latter consisted of Shlem-1 gas mask, the gas-protective cape and the gas-protective

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 11 -

50X1

stockings. There were no other individual protective chemical items such as anti-gas packets and salves. Personnel were trained to don their gas masks in four seconds and also to don the remainder of the chemical protective items in no more than one and one-half minutes. This portion of the training was the responsibility of the squad leaders. On very rare occasions one of the company officers would lecture on chemical training. In one such lecture the company CO gave a general description and identifications of such gases as Lewisite, Phosgene, mustard, hydrocyanic acid and other gases (which source has forgotten). The existence of Tabun gas was also mentioned, but it was described only as a nerve gas. No mention was made that the Soviet Army possessed any of these gases.

Source knew that his company gave some general training on decontamination methods to be used by the individual soldier. Individuals were to use either the buddy system to wipe exposed parts of the body with cotton swabs, using an unidentified decontamination solution which would be provided by the regimental chemical platoon, or to individually use anti-gas packets which would be issued.

6. Weapons Firing

In source's company the men fired three to four times a year. Those armed with the SKS carbine fired five rounds slow fire from the prone position at chest silhouette targets 200 m distant. For soldiers in the first year of service one hit was considered poor, two hits fair, three hits good and four hits excellent. For all other soldiers two hits were considered poor, three hits fair, four hits good and five hits excellent. Military personnel armed with the Kalashnikov SMG fired 20 rounds in short bursts from the prone position at three to four moving full-silhouette targets 200 m away. Detailed scoring methods for this weapon were unknown to source, but he knew that each target had to be hit for a good score.

7. Atomic Defense Training

Source vaguely associated training in atomic defense matters with chemical training, although the subject was given during periods other than those given for use of chemical defense training. Basically, the same Sig Co instructors who gave instruction in chemical defense training also gave instruction in atomic defense matters. The basic material used for atomic defense instruction was the Soldiers' and Sergeants' Handbook for Defense Against Atomic attack. When this manual first made its appearance in the regiment in 1954, there had been much emphasis placed on it. Less and less training as outlined in this manual was given in 1955, however.

The Company Commander read lectures from another unidentified manual dealing with atomic warfare matters. Source could only recall certain portions of or items from the contents of this manual. These odd bits are indicated here: a) shock waves travel two kilometers in two minutes and three kilometers in five minutes; b) radio-active rays lose 70 percent of their effectiveness one kilometer from the burst; c) a one meter layer of earth will give protection to an individual at this distance; d) individual soldiers should seek cover when they see the flash of light following the burst, should lie in his trench or behind a tank, if possible; and e) his individual chemical protective items will give some protection against radiation and he should put these on after seeking cover. 5.

This manual also stated that one kilogram of atomic matter needed "320 kilograms of casing" and that a hydrogen bomb must be set off by an atomic bomb. Source knew nothing concerning the actual meaning of this last statement but insisted that he had heard it. Source could not recall any other pertinent data from these lectures. There was no mention from this manual of unit formations under atomic warfare conditions.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 12 -

50X1

Squad leaders gave very little atomic defense training. They continued instructing their squads in the use of the conventional chemical defense protective items and gave some general instruction on decontamination procedures. Again, the "buddy system" was stressed. Men were shown how to brush atomic "dust" from each other with a small hand brush and to help each other remove badly contaminated clothing. It was stated that water was effective in decontamination, and it was stressed that all the washing of the body or equipment should start from the top and work down.

8. Inspections

The regimental Chief of Communications inspected training in the Sig Co daily. The regimental Chief of Staff inspected about once weekly. The regimental CO rarely came to the Signal company to inspect training. The Div CO visited the company about once annually, although he made monthly staff visits to the regiment. (See section C for further information on inspection of the Sig Co.) (See section B for regimental-level inspections including the Sig Co.)

E. ALERTS AND TRAINING EXERCISES

1. Alerts

Each year there were at least two regimental or larger unit alerts. Besides these alerts the regimental subunits conducted their own limited ones. The assembly point for the regiment was two kilometers outside of the caserne on the Ulmerfeld (N 48-04, E 14-49) Mauer Oehling road. Contact by phone was established between the caserne and the assembly area on permanent lines already installed. As soon as an alert was sounded, all caserne windows were blacked out with blankets. The personnel then put on full-field equipment, grabbed their weapons and proceeded to assigned jobs. Units loaded small arms ammunition, which was kept in each unit area. Assigned drivers went to their vehicles (which were normally on blocks), hooked up the batteries, hitched any towed equipment or guns, and were ready to move out within 15 minutes. Normally it took the regiment two hours to clear the caserne after an alert was sounded. Source did not know how much, if any, ammunition was taken from the regimental ammunition dump. He knew, however, that rear services supply was not moved.

One evening in April 1955, after dark during a heavy rainstorm, a particularly disastrous regimental alert was sounded by the division CO who had gone to the demarcation line to inspect the units there. At this point he had cut off telephone contact without this being known at regiment. He then directed that a phony message be sent via radio from the demarcation line to the regimental caserne that the demarcation line units were under attack. He then cut off radio communications. Complete chaos ruled in the regimental area. One battalion was hurriedly organized and left the caserne area in about 15 minutes in complete disorder, while the other units still were getting ready. Before the remainder of the regiment was prepared to move out, this battalion returned after being gone about two hours and learning what had actually happened. Source very humorously recalled the fear among the officers, and in particular he recalled how his company political officer finally got control of himself, gathered what men he could in the political dayroom and almost incoherently urged them to give their all and fight to the end. He was the laughing stock of the regiment for a long time thereafter. (Source understood that the division CO later severely criticized the regimental staff for its unpreparedness.)

2. Movement to the Field and Field Conditions

When the regiment went to the field at Allentsteig, the regimental school was left behind to guard the caserne. Each company also left two or three men behind in its company area to guard its buildings and company property.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 13 -

50X1

The line units of the regiment took all their organic weapons and equipment to the field, except for a few rear area service vehicles and deadlined vehicles. The regimental supply and service units took just enough equipment and supplies to last the regiment for the length of the exercise. All post, camp and station property, as well as most of the supplies in the regimental warehouses and storerooms, was left behind. The two regimental fuel tank trucks brought up the rear of the motor column and serviced the regimental vehicles in the field.

Most of the regimental companies did not have tentage. Some of the regimental headquarters units had some squad-size tents but not enough for all their personnel. Most of the EM made themselves as comfortable as they could with their ponches and overcoats or built lean-to's.

There were no shower facilities in the field, nor were there any recreational facilities. Each battalion and the regimental headquarters had several WW-II type towed field kitchens for messing facilities. Sometimes dry rations were given out. At other times the kitchens were located in a group some distance behind the regiment during a tactical exercise while at still other times they were with their units.

Camouflage was practiced in the field only during the actual play of an exercise. Most of the regimental units used foliage for camouflage. Some of the regimental artillery units had camouflage nets, but even these were few and far between.

During the field period all personnel were restricted to the regimental area. No one knew when the regiment would get up and move to another location in the course of the exercise; therefore all personnel obeyed this restriction.

There was little or no free time in the field. No additional training schedule was observed since the regiment was usually in a continuous tactical situation while in the field.

3. Field Exercises

Field exercises of source's regiment were held in the Allentsteig training area. Source saw some other elements of the division here and therefore concluded that for the most part these were division-level exercises.

a. Command Post Exercise in Feb 54

A command post exercise, involving portions of what source believed to be most of all of the division elements, were held in Feb 54 which lasted about six days. Source participated in them. The purpose of this exercise was to give CO's practical training in commanding and directing their units in simulated combat situations. The exercise of Feb 54 continued day and night and covered much ground. Source's job

The representation from source's regiment included only the command and signal elements of the regiment and its subordinate units.

50X1

b. Field Exercise in Aug 54

This field exercise lasted for about 12 days and was of regimental size. Source knew that it included training on the "regiment in the attack", "regiment in defense" and "regiment in the pursuit". Again source's job

CONFIDENTIAL

50X1

CONFIDENTIAL

- 14 -

50X1

50X1

unknown tank elements of the division simulated an attack on the regiment when it was in defense.

c. Field Exercise in Jan 55.

This exercise lasted for about 10 days and was apparently of division size since source had seen the 287th Gds Rifle Regt, the Arty Gun Regt of the division, division tank elements and other unknown division units in it. He could not give any great amount of detail on this exercise but did know that his own regiment was engaged both in the defense of a hastily prepared position and participated subsequently in what source thought was a march to the attack. His regiment thus moved out of its Mauer Oehling caserne late one evening, made a motor march along the Vienna-Linz highway towards Enns (N 48-12, E 14-28), crossed the Danube somewhere near Matthausen (coordinates not available) by bridge and then bivouaced in the woods near Urfahr (N 48-19, E 14-16). The next day it made a motor move to the Allentsteig training area by daylight, arriving there at night and taking up hastily prepared defensive positions along with other unknown elements of the division. At

50X1

The regiment remained in this defensive position for two days, during which other unidentified division elements made a simulated gas attack on its defensive position, using smoke pots. Front-line regimental troops put on gas masks. Four unidentified jet aircraft also made bombing runs on the defenders, dropping small dynamite rockets to the defenders' front on these passes which simulated strafing attacks. Moreover, this attack was supported by unidentified division tank elements.

Source's regiment was considered beaten but it was then reorganized for a counter-attack, being supported in this by elements of the 287th Gds Rifle Regt and unidentified division tank elements. This attack was made by means of a road march which was spearheaded by tanks; during it the units participating moved about 20 kilometers. While on the march word was passed that the enemy was "preparing to drop an atomic bomb". The attackers were ordered to don their gas masks if it became necessary to cross a simulated contaminated area immediately ahead of the column. Source did not know, however, if the forward elements actually carried out an attack or if the atomic bomb drop was simulated.

Following this counter-attack the exercises were ended and the regiment was set up administratively to reorganize, clean its equipment and prepare for movement to the regimental caserne area. Source himself spent most of his time during the second phase at the 1st Rifle Bn Hqs and saw very little of the overall exercise. However, he did form an opinion that the tactics stressed were as follows: "When the enemy is withdrawing, strike hard and swiftly with tank elements so that if the enemy is preparing to use atomic weapons, it will not be able to do so because you have moved up too close for them to use such weapons without endangering their own forces."

d. GPX in May 55

These command post exercises, assumed by source to be division level ones, lasted about 10 days. Source did not participate. This exercise was allegedly observed by Molotov and other Soviet dignitaries. Participating elements were essentially those in the Feb 54 GPX.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
- 15 -

50X1

e. Other Exercise

In June 55 the regiment was due for a rumored regimental size exercise.

4. Large Scale Motor Moves

The only large scale motor moves source ever witnessed was on the occasions when the regiment moved to the Allensteig Training Area during the above mentioned field exercises and CPX's. When the entire regiment, less three companies, moved to the training area, the movement was supposed to be made as a tactical march. At this time, the regimental Recon Co preceded the column (whose deployment he did not know), followed by the rifle battalions, which were followed by the Regt'l SP Btry. The remainder of the regiment followed behind these units, with the rear services bringing up the rear. Contact between the Recon Co and the rifle battalions was by radio. Distances within serials to be maintained were 20 m between vehicles, and the speed was up to 40 km per hour. Source did not know distances between various serials. Slightly over 100 vehicles were required to move the regiment.

The trip was about 170 km and required about 10 hours. However, the vehicles all became strung out along the way, and it took about 10 hours for all the units of the regiment to arrive at the training area. These moves to the training area were made by regimental organic transportation.

Only once did the bulk of the regiment make the movement by train. This was in Jan 54, when one battalion was stationed on the demarcation line. Then the regiment was fully loaded (administrative loading) at Mauer Oehling for this move. Source could give no further specific information on this move.

1. [redacted] for source's OB information on this as well as other units given in this report.

2. [redacted]'s Comment: At least two other [redacted] reported having seen classified films dealing with atomic warfare matters.

3. [redacted] for further information on the 107 mm rocket launcher.

4. [redacted] for source's description of regimental and signal company radio communications procedures. [redacted] for his description of the R-105 and R-106 radios.

5. [redacted] Comment: Some of source's technical information appears to vary from generally accepted results of an atomic explosion and reasonable atomic defense procedures. It is given as representing source's own description accurately transmitted.

6. [redacted] Comment: This exercise was at the time of the Vienna Conference.

LIBRARY SUBJECT AND AREA CODES--30
3-02-0406 12/55

238.2	N
238.21	N
173.5	N
238.22	N
238.41	N
223.46	N
223.44	N
238.5	N
238.3	N
238.25	N

CONFIDENTIAL